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Four Swiss Villages, 1860–1930: Putting
Gender back into Historical Demography
Anne-Franc¸oise Praz
Gender has become a central concept in the social sciences as a marker of the social and
cultural elaboration of sexual difference and of power relations. In some disciplines
however, its relevance has been more difficult to establish; this is notably the case
for historical demography, as research has only recently made use of the connection
between gender and demographic processes.1 This is rather astonishing, since the
discipline deals with a range of questions where gender is basic, such as life courses
of men and women, family and extended family relations, sexuality, childrearing and
contraception.
The main purpose of this article is to show that the concept of gender is fundamen-
tal for historical demography and that it allows us to improve the explanatory power of
the models used in this discipline. To begin with, I will identify some theoretical and
methodological reasons that explain the late integration of gender in historical demog-
raphy, and then focus on some current developments in the discipline that would help
to overcome these blockages. This will be followed by two examples of the integration
of a gender perspective in a central topic of historical demography, the so-called first
demographic transition in Europe. Historians and demographers established that the
secular decline of fertility in Europe occurred in two phases. A first decline in marital
fertility took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1870–1930), and
was realised through rudimentary birth control practices such as abstinence or with-
drawal. There was a historically unprecedented shift from high numbers of children
per family to fewer, but better nurtured and educated children. The elucidation of such
a great social transformation has generated abundant research.2 The second fertility
transition was initiated in the mid-1960s, thanks to the emergence and generalisation
of modern contraceptive methods that could be controlled by women.
Women’s history and historical demography: mutual ignorance
Women’s history emerged as a discipline in the 1970s at the same time that historical
demography was gaining importance, thanks particularly to the development of stan-
dardised and quantitative research procedures. Although its sources and methods could
have provided part of the ‘mass of information’ that Virginia Woolf called for to fill in
the gaps in the history of women – ‘at what age did she marry; how many children had
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she as a rule; what was her house like?’3 – historical demography and the emerging
women’s history did not, in fact, meet. It is not the aim of this paper to explore the
political or institutional reasons for this mutual ignorance.4 Instead, I shall examine
some internal, methodological points, which could throw light on this lack of initial
recognition and cooperation in order to speed up the integration of gender in historical
demography. Most of the scientific misunderstandings and divergences are rooted in
two related problems: on the one hand in women’s history, the experiences of individ-
uals were not convincingly integrated into causal explanations of changing behaviours
and the resulting social change; on the other hand in historical demography, individuals
vanished into the aggregate.
The considerable achievements, but also the limits, of women’s history are well
known;5 here, I will underline some of the salient points. As Gisela Bock suggested,
women’s history, by making women a subject of research, rendered historically visible
both women’s subjection and their subjectivity. Concepts of ‘male domination’ and of
‘consciousness’ were central to this project.
The concept of ‘male domination’ tended to be used ahistorically and was of
little help in understanding the mechanisms through which the unequal power rela-
tions between the sexes changed or reproduced through history. To document women’s
oppression, scholars resorted to the abundant normative discourses aimed to regulate
women’s behaviour, though often without examining their impact. As far as women’s
history was concerned, the chief institution of male domination and women’s
oppression, in the view of most feminists of that period, was the private sphere of
the family. This conceptualisation led to a disregard of the family as a research topic,
contrasting with its centrality in historical demography, and to a focus mainly on indi-
vidual women beyond family ties, on their struggles in the public sphere of work, of
social action and politics.6 Women’s experiences in the family were neglected, even
when they could have provided interesting insights for documenting the changing con-
dition of women. For instance, the first fertility transition, by reducing the number of
children per family, drastically modified the situation of the vast majority of mothers
and the length of women’s childbearing years dropped dramatically.7
The second concept, ‘consciousness’, highlighted the meanings women gave to
their experiences, as well as women’s individual or collective actions actively to shape
their own lives. Through biographies and studies exploring women’s culture or spe-
cific groups or movements, women’s experiences and agency were brought into his-
tory. Scholars relied primarily on literary sources, above all personal testimonies in the
form of letters, autobiographies and oral history, as more suitable to reveal women’s
subjectivities. Often the mechanisms through which this consciousness modified be-
haviours and led to social change remained elusive. Consequently, the connection
between women’s experiences with broader historical processes and structures was not
clearly articulated. As a result, individual women were often conceptualised in contra-
dictory ways, viewed either as independent actors or as victims of forces outside their
control.8
In contrast, historical demographers in the 1970s ignored perspectives of sub-
jectivity and individual agency. There were two main reasons for this. Subjectivities
and meanings are not dimensions that are easily measurable. They clashed with the
very same methodological procedures, namely measurement and quantification, which
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gained scientific acceptance for historical demography as a discipline. Demographers
were more interested in behaviour more easily quantifiable and actions that are regarded
as the proximate determinants of social change. Consequently, individual events like
marriage or childrearing were discussed as measurable occurrences within a popula-
tion, with little reference to specific experiences of individuals. Women’s history was
very sceptical of quantification, which was seen as ‘positivistic’ and neglectful of im-
portant questions about women and family. This belief was strengthened by the fact that
quantification often relied on historical statistical material that is fraught with gender
bias.
Neither individual agency nor real individuals were in the picture. Historical de-
mography addressed households and demographic rates, rather than women and men as
actors or subjects. Even when data were collected at the individual level, the methods
used tended to aggregate individual units like family members, or individual events
like births, marriages and deaths, in order to obtain household structures or average
demographic rates. Patterns of variation were explained either by strictly demographic
mechanisms (for example, the number of births, marriages and deaths as the ‘proxi-
mate determinants’ of the composition of kin groups), or by large-scale impersonal,
structural forces like increasing urbanisation and industrialisation. Such explanations
did not try to relate these structural features to individual characteristics, but merely
established correlations between macro-variables: for example, declining fertility in a
given region was explained by the decreasing proportion of its population employed in
agriculture, instead of showing how certain types of agricultural production determined
the living conditions and the costs and benefits of children.9 From data collection to
the final explanation, the ‘individual’ progressively vanished, first as a unit of analysis,
and then as a conscious and possibly active agent in the process under study. The con-
sequences of a given demographic rate or a given household structure in the everyday
life of men and women were neglected and differences in their life courses were not
seen as appropriate subjects of research, although the relevant data were often avail-
able. As Alison Mackinnon correctly observed of the debate on the fertility transition,
demographers had portrayed fertility as ‘a characteristic of populations rather than of
persons’.10
Historical demography was no less problematic and closely linked to the issue of
individuals or aggregates when it came to power relations between the sexes. To be
sure, historical demographers became aware of the inadequacy of explanations based
on correlations between aggregates and they had begun to consider the individual as the
unit of analysis, trying to identify mechanisms that could account for the influence of
macro-structures on ‘private’ demographic behaviour. But, even when they claimed to
comply with a methodologically individualist approach, many scholars failed to make
the last and crucial step, namely the disaggregation of the family. In many standard
demographic models, the ‘household/family’, the ‘couple’ or the ‘parents’ were taken as
a unified subject, presupposing harmonious needs and aligned interests between women
and men. Moreover, ‘household’ was often substituted for ‘family’, thus conflating
kinship and contract relations (servants, lodgers, etc.) and the nuclear and extended
family.
Feminist scholars in the fields of historical demography and anthropology, as well
as in demography and economics reacted to these shortcomings. Ellen C. DuBois and
her co-authors rightly criticised the historical approach that identified women with the
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family or the couple ‘in a way that totally ignored their independent existence and hid
the conflicts they had in and with the family institution’.11 The anthropologist Paola
Tabet castigates demographers for their use of the concept of ‘natural fertility’, implying
that human reproductive behaviour is ‘natural’ in the absence of fertility control. Such
an approach reinforced the tendency to reduce women to their biological function
of giving birth, ignoring the social dimension of human reproduction that is shaped
by cultural norms and power relations. According to Tabet, this view overlooks the
social rules of marriage and sexuality, whose purpose in traditional societies was often
to institute power relations that assured a maximal exposure of women to the risk of
childbearing.12 Susan Cotts Watkins, reviewing thirty years of the journal Demography,
demonstrated that articles on fertility, marriage and the family were often built on
unquestioned assumptions about women’s behaviour (seen primarily as producers of
children and of child services) and that issues of power within the family are ignored
almost completely.13 The economic historian Nancy Folbre pointed out that any explicit
consideration of economic inequalities between the sexes and between the generations
was missing from explanations of fertility decline. She argued convincingly for the
need to disaggregate the family unit, as the family is not ‘a decision-making black box
. . . it is a group of individuals who make collective, but not necessarily consensual
decisions’.14 Alison Mackinnon resumed the criticisms made by feminist scholars of
the analysis of the first fertility transition by historical demographers and pointed out
new studies that attempt to integrate women’s agency, the changing position of women
and changing conjugal relations into the models.
Gender and historical demography: the new meeting ground
In the mid-1980s, women’s history and historical demography introduced the concept of
gender. This initiated decisive turns, enabling them to overcome previous problems and
become susceptible to new and more open perspectives. The insights gained through
developments in the history of gender relations have resulted in the current debate. How
could historical demography integrate gender and enhance its explanatory models in
making this concept workable for its specific field, and how, in turn, could historical
demography improve the concept of gender itself? This article will investigate four new
research directions for historical demography that arise from the introduction of gender:
first, the impact of the gender system on the individual life courses of men and women;
second, the importance of the gender system for family economy and demographic
behaviour; third, the influence of gender norms on demographic processes like fertility
and marriage; and finally, the way that institutions (especially the state), which are
leading forces in the social construction of gender, influence demographic behaviour.
In the following, we will sketch some attempts that have been undertaken to tackle
these issues and discuss some remaining or emerging problems.
Historical demography is now better able to capture the individual characteristics
of men’s and women’s lives. On the technical level, a more individual oriented approach
is easier to realise with the method of life-course or event-history analysis. More
individual destinies become accessible because the method overcomes the limitation
of sources that previously restricted the study to those individuals pertaining to stable
(non migrant) and conventional families, a bias which has often been criticised. Event-
history analysis focuses on ‘transitions in individual lives and the choices associated
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with them’, for example the decisions to work, to leave the parental household, to
marry, to bear children and so on. These individual events are used to construct a
database, allowing the application of statistical models that show the interplay between
the occurrence and the timing of each event on the one hand and, on the other hand, some
family characteristics (siblings, death of one parent and so on), and specific individual
attributes, both biological ones such as age, and social attributes such as civil status,
occupation, religion, or geographical origin. The individual rather than the aggregate
becomes the unit of analysis. For example, the question is no longer what proportion of
households are headed by a single parent, but rather, under what conditions and what
proportion of their lives children spend living with one parent. The tension between
individual choice and family constraints is also addressed, as the models seize on the
impact of changing historical conditions – for example, the availability of waged work
and its impact on the extent that individuals could escape from familial obligations.
George Alter’s study of women’s destinies in a Belgian town is a pioneering example.
He brings into focus the everyday lives of ordinary women, showing how they struggle
for their own and their relatives’ well-being, how they move in and out of family
households and how they shift from one status to another.15
This kind of analysis provides significant results, highlighting the differences and
similarities between the individual lives of men and women from different classes and
cultural settings, and testing the respective impact of family obligations and economic
opportunities. However, some aspects often remain elusive in these studies: the link
between these life-courses and the power relations between the sexes, as well as the
link between these life-courses and the political processes and the cultural norms that
shape gender status. Working patterns, for example, are related to the structural features
of the economic environment, but not always to the legal framework, and the reasons
behind the gender division between paid and unpaid work are not explored.
The importance of gender and age status, and of the power relations involved, has
led to a more sensitive analysis of the family in the household economics approach.
Its basic principles are inspired by the models of institutional economics that show
how property rights, contractual obligations and social norms shape the distribution
of resources, the bargaining power and the decision-making processes in such diverse
organisations as families or firms.16 Instead of considering the family as a unified
subject, this approach takes into account conflicts and compromises between its mem-
bers, who are endowed with unequal resources and power. As the feminist economist
Nancy Folbre has pointed out, these inequalities are not simply determined by market
position, but largely by legal and cultural frameworks: the position of an individual in
the family is related to the position of his/her social category, for example his/her sex
category, in a given time and place.17 In her research on a peasant region of Spain (the
Montes de Pas), Carmen Sarasu´a identifies these intra-family inequalities, assessing
each individual’s participation in family work and each individual’s access to family
resources. The result is a hierarchical family organisation that redistributes family re-
sources from female to male children, especially to assure the latter’s education and
career. This asymmetrical investment in male and female education was justified by
social norms that defined the proper role of women (to serve God, care for the home
and obey their husband), for which education was considered unnecessary.18 My own
research, presented below, explores this particular discrimination in different religious
and political contexts and tries to determine its impact on fertility differentials.
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Despite these developments, even recent research does not always consider the
importance of both the thoroughgoing disaggregation of the family or take into account
the bargaining power between the sexes. Alter’s modelling of fertility decisions is a good
example, as he still postulated the couple as the decision-maker in a paper published in
1992: ‘couples must weigh the costs and benefits of life with one more child against the
costs and benefits of life without another child plus the costs of preventing the birth of the
next child’.19 This conflation leads historical demographers to misleading statements
when they attempt to reintroduce individuals into the picture. Ronny Lesthaeghe, a
prominent European demographer, provides a good example in his interpretation of
the fertility transition debate, alleging that individual control of reproduction emerged
during the ‘first fertility transition’. This ‘individual’ turns out to be the couple; the
author assumes that fertility decisions are a common interest or even consensual. Such
a shortcut prevents scholars from investigating the power relations between spouses, as
well as the historical change in gender norms and constraints. Actually, it is becoming
clear that during the first fertility transition (1870–1930), gender norms usually forbade
women to make any decision or even have knowledge of sexual matters; it was only
during the second fertility transition (1965–onwards) that every individual concerned
obtained the publicly accepted rights and the technical means to control their fertility. In
overlooking this gender dimension, Lesthaeghe proposes a spurious delineation of the
two fertility transitions, suggesting that ‘the first fertility transition fully demonstrates
the growing importance of individual autonomy that is individual freedom and refusal
of an external moral authority’; this rebellion against moral authority was supposed
to occur ‘silently in the intimacy of the private sphere’, contrasting with the second
transition, when it broke out into the public sphere.20 Instead of this story of private
versus public rebellion, it is rather the changing rights and resources of women that
distinguish the second fertility transition from the first one.
As representations of sex differences, as well as informal norms of masculinity
and femininity, are intimately connected with the changing meaning of sexuality and
reproduction, they certainly influence demographic trends of nuptiality and fertility.
Historical demographers are beginning to take this cultural aspect into account and
have turned to the findings and methods of anthropology and cultural history, as well
as to new sources (texts, or oral or written testimonies of individuals) and qualitative
methods (for example, discourse analysis or interviews).21 Kate Fischer’s oral history
study of the fertility decline among the British working class provides an interesting
example. She challenges the previous, but untested, assertion that women were the
leading force in the adoption of birth control during the first fertility transition because
of their greater interest in the matter. Actually, given the contraceptive means then
available and given the dominant gender culture in the British working-class families
she studied, respectable wives were expected to be ignorant about sexual matters while
husbands were able to decide unilaterally about contraception and generally did.22
Such a result has to be tested in other population groups and the question to what
extent women had influence or autonomy in birth control issues remains a matter of
debate. The use of abortion as a contraceptive technique controlled by women has
been suggested by many scholars,23 and the rate of abortion among marrying women –
rising considerably around 1900 in many European countries – could indicate their de-
termination to terminate pregnancies. However, it remains questionable whether abor-
tion was a display of women’s power to control their fertility in a self-determined
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manner or a last resort when male-dominated practices such as withdrawal had
failed.
The concept of gender has thus increasingly enriched the study of the cultural
components of fertility behaviour, hitherto limited to the impact of religious and
linguistic factors. However, these new approaches should not reintroduce the mis-
leading opposition between cultural and economic causes of demographic behaviour,
particularly fertility, which historical demographers have striven to overcome. For
this reason, they have relied on economic decision models that offer a general ex-
planation of individual decisions and permit the transformation of all types of con-
textual features, material and cultural, into the same kind of ‘theoretical money’,
costs and benefits. Fertility behaviour can thus be considered as responding to var-
ious cost–benefit incentives: the material cost of children, the information cost of
contraception, the moral cost of contraception depending on religious doctrine, the
social cost of having more or fewer children according to the ideal of parenthood in
a specific class, or the social cost of a given sexual behaviour according to gender
norms.
A gender perspective points to the fact that wives and husbands are positioned
differently with respect to each kind of cost. This perspective is certainly more fruitful
than a model that tries to assess the pre-eminence of cultural factors over material
ones or vice versa. For example, John Gillis contrasts the ‘economistic’ argument of
changing costs of children during the first fertility transition with the cultural argument
of the changing meaning of fatherhood and motherhood, which he considered more
significant.24 Notwithstanding the importance of changing meanings of parenthood, I
would argue that this change provokes in turn a change in the costs of children, to whom
more time and goods are dedicated. Moreover, it is only by observing and measuring
an effective change in the costs of children in some social group, that historical demog-
raphers are able to demonstrate the mechanism through which a change in the meaning
of parenthood actually induces a change in fertility behaviour. Undoubtedly, linking
qualitative insights about the meanings individuals give to their experiences to demo-
graphic results remains a great challenge for demographers. Nevertheless, by elucidat-
ing and testing such links, explanatory models of demographic behaviour become more
convincing.
A fourth direction of research provides insights into the crucial mechanisms that
transform norms into effective costs for individuals, shaping the decisions they have
to face, especially in regard to fertility control. Such studies, called the ‘political econ-
omy of fertility’,25 emphasise the role of state policies in regulating fertility behaviour.
This is especially true for the second part of the nineteenth century onwards, when
state institutions gained importance in regulating family life, compared to religious or
other traditional institutions. As S. Ryan Johansson proposed, it was not through pub-
lic policies overtly planned to influence demographic trends that the state was really
efficient, for pro-natalist policies generally failed, but through ‘implicit policies’ that
modified the rights and responsibilities of certain categories of individuals and, con-
sequently, influenced the cost–benefit balance determining demographic behaviour.26
Fertility trends were largely related to school policies that gave more rights to children
and thereby increased the costs of their upbringing. There is also a strong relationship
between the opportunity costs of childrearing and the gendered structure of the labour
market, namely the extent of discrimination against women. State policies such as work
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legislation and social measures influenced the distribution of gender roles in the labour
market and thus modified these costs.27
When historical demographers highlight the central role of institutions in the mech-
anisms translating norms and laws into effective costs influencing fertility decisions,
they must take gender into consideration. Since institutional processes attribute rights
and responsibilities to individuals according to categories, it is impossible to avoid the
fact that categorisation by sex is historically one of the most pervasive. Notably, dur-
ing the first fertility transition, gender was a prominent target of state policies. Norms
of femininity and masculinity prescribed different behaviours regarding sexuality and
contraception; women and men were not subject to the same work legislation, girls and
boys were not considered equal in curricula and in public expenditure on education.
However, the process is not unidirectional, as historical conditions also give individuals
opportunities to challenge the social norms and modify the institutional processes in
favour of gender equality. For example, the better education of women gives them more
consciousness and facilitates the emergence of social movements fighting for women’s
emancipation. Yet, the integration of this gendering process in the explanatory models
of historical demography still remains relatively undeveloped. In the following section,
two examples of how this integration can be realised are presented.
The first fertility transition in two Swiss regions
The first fertility transition that occurred in Europe at the turn of the twentieth century
is described as the shift in demographic structures away from high levels of celibacy,
high rates of births and deaths and late ages of marriage, and towards low levels of
births and deaths, as well as early and universal marriage. The marked decline in
marital fertility between 1870 and 1930, through the generalisation of rudimentary
birth control practices such as abstinence and withdrawal is particularly fascinating. In
Switzerland, for example, the average number of children per woman of childbearing
age dropped from 4.3 to 2.1 during this period. While the statistical dimensions of this
phenomenon are nowadays well established, demographers still cannot satisfactorily
explain the various paths and timings of this momentous change.
Switzerland figures as a miniature laboratory to study this decline, because of
its cultural diversity especially in language and religion, as well as its political or-
ganisation. A long historical antagonism between Catholics and Protestants limited
the contact between the different geographical areas and thus upheld heterogeneity. A
strong federalism gave the governments of the twenty-three cantons important powers
and autonomy in many domains. As a result, the impact of these various policies on
fertility behaviour can easily be compared.
The first purpose of the study was to examine the impact of cultural factors like
religion and political ideology on fertility. Therefore, two French-speaking cantons
were selected that differed in these respects: the canton of Vaud, Protestant and led
by progressive authorities, and the canton of Fribourg, Catholic with a conservative
government. In order to isolate the impact of cultural variables, two villages were se-
lected in each canton with respect to contemporaneous socio-economic factors. The
first pair of villages simultaneously experienced the same industrialisation process
(a chocolate factory). The second pair, two neighbouring communities, maintained
an economic structure based on agriculture and fishing (Figure 1). A database of
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Figure 1: Demographic Variables in Four Swiss Villages (1860–1930)
information about fertility behaviour was created. The parochial and civil registers
provide the basis for family reconstruction including marriages celebrated between
1860 and 1930 that produced 5,381 legitimate births for 1,848 married and fecund
women under observation.
In spite of the very similar economic conditions, the fertility decline in the Catholic
villages took place far later. The usual explanation given by historical demography for
such a variation refers to the prohibition of contraceptive practices in Catholic doctrine.
But such an explanation is problematic, because the implementation of this part of
Catholic doctrine was not effective at this time. Indeed, around 1900, the Catholic
Church preferred not to recall the faithful to the path of sexual morality, in order to
avoid conflicts that might have initiated or accelerated the process of secularisation
already underway.28 In Fribourg, the Catholic authorities expressed no clear warning
against contraception before the late 1920s.29 It is therefore important to explore other
components of religious and political culture that could account for such a difference
in fertility behaviour: the gender system.
Gender inequalities in education and fertility decline
In a pioneering article, John Caldwell argued that ‘the primary determinant of the
timing of the onset of the fertility transition is the effect of mass education on the
family economy’.30 Since it increases the cost of children, education constitutes an
important incentive to practise birth control, all the more so when compulsory schooling
is rigorously implemented by the state. Several studies have analysed the influence of
education on fertility using a gender approach, most of them examining the influence
of the mother’s education on their fertility level.31 A classic procedure is to use the
mother’s educational attainment as an explanatory variable. My study highlights another
process, focusing on the costs of education for boys and girls and on the differential
use of boys or girls in family work as economic incentives susceptible to postpone or
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to accelerate the adoption of birth control. What was the impact of school policies on
fertility, taking into account the fact that these policies were gendered, and that this
gender dimension varied according to political and religious culture?
I therefore attempted to document the investment in children’s education by the
parents in the villages studied. Administrative sources (pupil listings, school attendance
statistics and correspondence from the school authorities)32 provided indications about
the school career of the children, and were augmented by assumptions based on the
subsequent professions of these children at marriage or death. For the 5,042 legitimate
children who survived until age fifteen, we managed to reconstitute the school career
of 2,353 of them (1,333 boys and 1,020 girls).33 For each canton, in order to detail
attitudes towards education, we selected qualitative material such as political discourse,
educational periodicals and school manuals, as well as the effective state policies as
proclaimed in official publications, legislation and correspondence between cantonal
and local authorities.
The importance of education in general and its relevance for women in particular
was viewed very differently in the two cantons, as a content analysis of this material
demonstrates.34 In the Protestant and progressive culture of Vaud, both men and women
were supposed to develop the intellectual capacities God had given them, for their
own spiritual enlightenment and for the improvement of civic virtues.35 In Protestant
educational periodicals, knowledge was considered important for women, the mothers
of future citizens. Even the fact that they had no political rights and that their future
social role would keep them bound to the home were not judged reason enough for
limiting their scope: girls had to study history and geography to learn ‘the progress
of the institutions and the advent of democracy’, and to know ‘where the rice and
the coffee they use every day come from’.36 The school reading books present the
mother as playing an important role in children’s schooling where she is often depicted
checking their homework and exercise books.37 In the Catholic and conservative cul-
ture of Fribourg, knowledge was considered as potentially dangerous, a source of the
sin of pride or of rebellion against the established authorities. According to Catholic
educational periodicals, girls’ education had to prepare skilled and pious housekeep-
ers. The texts contrasted this ideal with two discredited feminine figures that abso-
lutely were to be avoided: the coquettish woman and the learned woman. The rhetoric
often joined these figures in the same sentence, inducing the idea that knowledge is a
vanity, even a sin for women, and that too learned a woman would represent a dan-
ger for family and society.38 The girls’ school programme, in accordance with their
social destiny, was forced to make a large place for housekeeping and needlework,
limiting the study of other disciplines to the most basic skills. In the school reading
books, the exemplary mother never worries about school and homework, but teaches
her child to pray and only recommends that he or she obey the teacher, who is God’s
representative.
These respective discourses and ideologies shaped school policies. The Protes-
tant canton implemented compulsory schooling more efficiently, as school atten-
dance was regularly controlled and absenteeism severely repressed. Parents could
not take their children out of school to use them as workers before they reached
the legal age of sixteen, whatever their sex, and exceptions were extremely rare. Co-
education was the rule until the age of sixteen, which limited gender differences in
access to disciplines and programmes. Post-primary education for girls and boys was
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recommended and fostered by the decentralisation of secondary or professional schools,
and girls’ educational institutes for post-primary education received public support. In
the Catholic canton, school policies were sharply gender-biased. The control and repres-
sion of school absenteeism was relatively haphazard, particularly for girls. School struc-
tures were mostly segregated by sex; the cantonal authorities provided post-primary
public – and free – schools for boys only, leaving girls’ post-primary education to
religious and private educational institutes that only rich families could afford. Above
all, the school system permitted many exceptions in school attendance for teenagers,
especially for girls, whose parents often took them out of school before the legal age.
Using the event-history analysis method, the study finally examined the impact
of these gendered ideologies and policies on the effective parental investment in chil-
dren’s education. The statistical models used make it possible to measure the factors
influencing two aspects for each child’s life course: first, the chance of attending a
post-primary school which implied significant monetary costs for the parents includ-
ing fees, books, travel and maintenance; second, the moment that each child left school
for work, which indicates the opportunity costs that parents incurred, because the longer
the child attended school, the later he or she contributed to the family budget.39 The
difference between the two religious cultures in these areas is striking. Among the
factors that modified a child’s chance of attending post-primary school, the variable
male sex multiplied this chance by only 2.45 in the Protestant canton, compared to
4.75 in the Catholic canton. When we observe the risk of leaving school earlier, this
was particularly high for Catholic girls compared to Catholic boys, while the gender
difference was very small in the Protestant sample.
These results demonstrate that Protestant parents met with substantial costs for
the education of their children, both boys and girls, which, I would argue, constituted
an important incentive to practise birth control. The most marked decline in fertility for
both Protestant villages, whatever their economic structure, occurred simultaneously
in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, which is precisely when compulsory
schooling was implemented in the canton. In the Catholic canton, although compul-
sory schooling was implemented at the same time, this did not initiate the fertility
transition. The causal links seem to be straightforward: in permitting marked discrimi-
nation against girls, the school policies allowed Catholic parents to avoid considerable
education costs and birth control was thus less imperative for Catholic families.
Institutional regulation was also shaped by the attitudes of the families towards
school policies, sometimes generating acute conflict and local resistance. Careful analy-
sis of such conflicts shows that compromises were mainly to the cost of girls’ education.
In the Catholic canton, the government granted many individual exceptions to parents
opposed to mandatory schooling; as a rule, the parents concerned used this opportunity
to take their girls out of school. Instead of opting for a similar individualised procedure,
the Protestant canton of Vaud preferred to endow local authorities with more leeway.
These were allowed to fix the girls’ age of liberation from compulsory schooling one
year earlier than for boys; this decision, taken every year by the local council, had a col-
lective effect for all the girls in the commune. However, as the influence of lower-class
family heads (who were more dependent on child labour) was weak in these councils,
parents who saw it in their interests to increase the education of girls were able to
impose their views.
This analysis shows how the integration of gender into the explanatory model
C© The author 2007. Journal compilation C© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007
Putting Gender back into Historical Demography 253
throws new light on the delay of fertility decline for Catholic populations; this delay
has been attested to in many demographic studies, yet a full understanding of the
mechanisms of the influence of religion is still a matter of debate. Conversely, it is
also important for gender history to take into account certain results of demographic
research that provide empirical evidence, as in this example showing the differences in
discrimination against girls according to religious culture. Research in gender history
often investigates the change of gender norms in diverse discourses and their imple-
mentation by various institutional means. However, as such data are rarely directly
available and very time-consuming to produce, it has not always been possible to test
systematically the impact of these norms at the individual level, so as to be able to tell
the whole story in laying bare the mechanisms whereby norms translate into specific
constraints.
Social construction of masculinity and fertility decline
As the Catholic Church did not clearly articulate the prohibition of contraception until
1925–30, and as the Protestant Church also remained silent, it was, in fact, state poli-
cies that shaped the moral acceptability of contraception in particular and the norms
governing sexuality and procreation more generally. Indeed, during the period of the
first fertility transition, state institutions gained importance in regulating family life,
compared to religious or other traditional institutions; they took over many tasks that
interfered with fertility decisions (such as education, welfare and morality) and that
were traditionally the churches’ remit. These state institutions also became more effi-
cient than the religious ones: they could enforce policies that constrained all families,
and not only those who felt a sense of attachment to a religious community.
Recent studies emphasise the impact of the public debate on birth control. On the
one hand, the existence of such a debate is supposed to speed up the generalisation of
contraceptive practices by diminishing the weight of taboos relative to sexuality and,
consequently, the moral costs of contraception.40 On the other hand, this public debate
helped to legitimise contraceptive practices and parents with numerous children may
have come to be stigmatised as irresponsible and so the social costs of having numerous
children increased.
I tested the hypothesis that state policies, by tolerating or prohibiting this public
debate, favoured traditional norms or permitted the establishment of new rules regarding
sexual issues. As these norms and rules were always gender specific, these state policies
participated in the reconstruction of the gender system, redefining the respective rights
and duties of women and men in regard to sexuality and contraception and thereby their
bargaining power in fertility decisions. Again, it must be assumed that such a process
is influenced by the religious and political settings.
Catholic culture in Fribourg promoted a fatalist conception of family size, and
parents were told to accept all the children that ‘God might give them’. This fatalism
weighed heavily on women, especially if we bear in mind the concept of marital debt,
namely the wife’s obligation not to deny sexual gratification to her husband. This
ideology strengthened men’s rights to marital sexuality and favoured frequent sexual
intercourse, thereby sustaining high levels of fertility. This concept of Catholic morality
was reinforced during the period under study. Girls’ education gave the highest priority
to moral behaviour, stressing obedience, innocence and purity; women were to be
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totally ignorant about sexual issues and behave as obedient wives. At the same time,
the political context impeded opposition to this Catholic morality. The conservative
authorities prohibited any public debate on sexual issues, in order to avoid discussion
that could have weakened the credibility of the Catholic Church, their best political
ally. The neo-Malthusian movement, very active in French-speaking Switzerland at
the beginning of the twentieth century, was not allowed to organise any conference
or publish any materials that advocated birth control. Consequently, no other opinion
openly challenged traditional Catholic morality and its professed inequality between
the spouses, thus maintaining a state of unequal bargaining power in fertility decisions.
In the Protestant canton by contrast, state policies tolerated public debate on birth
control, through which a good example of the process of gendering sexual rights can
be read.41 Contraceptive information was only considered problematic for certain cat-
egories of men such as bachelors and workers, this latter delineation being a matter of
controversy according to the political ideology of the protagonists.42 By contrast, ac-
cess to and use of contraceptive means was always considered unthinkable for women
of all social classes. This wide consensus rallied Protestant ministers, political elites of
every ideology and even feminist leaders. With the rare known exception of one neo-
Malthusian feminist, Margarethe Faas-Hardegger,43 all women engaged in feminist or
philanthropic associations either kept silent about the topic or expressed a preference
for marital continence against women’s use of contraceptives, which were viewed as
injurious to women’s sensibility and dignity.44 This denial of women’s rights to sexual
and contraceptive information reinforced the husband’s legitimacy to act unilaterally in
this domain. However, a significant feature emerged in this debate that was absent in the
Catholic discourse: the husband’s rights were not considered to be unlimited. He had
to restrict his sexual pleasure and practise birth control, out of respect for his paternal
responsibilities, the well-being of his children and their chances of rising up the social
ladder, as well as the health of his wife. The debate about health authorised not only the
mention of sexual issues in a ‘decent and respectable’ way; it also allowed so-called
bourgeois feminists to express an astonishingly vehement denunciation of the ‘sexual
exploitation of women in marriage’.45 Such public debate modified the norms of mas-
culinity and fatherhood by challenging the unlimited masculine prerogatives in marital
sexuality and in stressing men’s responsibilities for the family. These changes affected
the social costs of numerous children for men and thereby encouraged convergence
between wives’ and husbands’ motivations for fertility control.
How can the impact of these changing norms on reproductive behaviour be mea-
sured? Is it possible to construct indicators that reveal such a convergence of spouses’
motivation for birth control? My idea was to observe, comparing Catholic and Protes-
tant couples, the effect of a factor generally associated with an increase in the bargain-
ing power of women; their participation in the labour market. It can be assumed that
Catholic and Protestant working mothers in the industrialised villages experienced the
same working conditions, because the two factories belonged to the same company
and offered similar salaries and social benefits. Therefore, they would have similar in-
terests in birth control, since the charge of numerous children on top of paid work was
a very heavy burden. But the interests of Catholic and Protestant husbands would have
differed, if we assume that Protestant men integrated the changing norms of masculin-
ity demanding sexual self-control and familial responsibilities. These husbands were
already motivated to practise birth control whatever their wives’ position in the labour
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market, and these women did not need to convince them. Consequently, differences in
fertility between working mothers and non-working mothers should not be significant
in the Protestant sample, all others variables being controlled. In the Catholic sample,
by contrast, differences in motivation between spouses remained high. Therefore, only
the women who had more leverage to impose their interest in fertility control should
have been able to reduce their fertility, as in the case for working mothers.
To test this hypothesis, I measured, for each mother, the impact of diverse variables
on the probability of another birth in a shorter time. Among the independent variables,
such as mother’s age, death of the previous child that terminated the contraceptive effect
of lactation, or husband’s occupation as indicator of the socio-economic category,
I introduced the variable factory worker – indicating if the mother was or was not
working in the factory. The same model was then applied separately to the Protestant
and the Catholic sample, and the results confirmed my assumptions. The variable
factory worker had no significant impact on fertility for Protestant mothers. In the
Catholic sample, however, the same variable did have a significant effect. For Catholic
mothers who worked in the factory, the risk of another birth was reduced by 16 per
cent, compared to the other Catholic mothers, whatever the husband’s occupation or
other controlled variables.
This kind of analysis and these results may raise interpretative problems and
technical criticisms that have to be debated, but they constitute an attempt to capture
the impact of gender norms and bargaining power between spouses on the demographic
process of fertility decline. The existence of certain norms in various kinds of discourses
is not evidence of their impact on fertility behaviour.
Conclusion
Historical demographers cannot avoid incorporating gender into their explanations
of historical trends of fertility, mortality, nuptiality and migration. Attention to the
social process of gendering is actually a key element for capturing the linkage between
individual lives and larger historical processes, and this linkage is crucial to explain
the mechanisms historical demographers strive to identify. Recent developments in
the discipline provide useful technical and theoretical tools to achieve this goal: the
individual-oriented approach and the statistical models of event-history analysis; the
application of institutional economics to study intra-family inequalities and bargaining
power; the enlargement of cultural components of demographic behaviour, including
gender norms; and last but not least, the analysis of institutions, especially the state.
These are invaluable tools that allow economic and cultural features to be translated into
an understanding of the rights and duties of individuals and thereby into the effective
costs and benefits that influence individual behaviour. As these rights and duties are
historically gendered, any explanation of demographic behaviour must integrate this
dimension.
This study of the first fertility transition in Switzerland challenges the usual ex-
planation of the delay of Catholic families in the adoption of birth control, attributed
to the religious norms against contraception, and proposes two alternative mechanisms
that make use of the concept of gender. The first one focuses on gender inequalities
in access to education, much pronounced in the Catholic culture, which permitted
Catholic parents to avoid major costs in educating their female children and postpone
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the necessity of birth control. The second consists in the historical change in norms of
masculinity and fatherhood in Protestant culture, which was absent among Catholics,
which increased the social costs of numerous families and made the motivation for
fertility control between wives and husbands converge.
Certainly, this integration of gender into explanatory mechanisms requires the
exploration of new fields and sources not always familiar to historical demographers.
Moreover, models need to be improved by bringing together qualitative and quantitative
analysis, while methodological procedures that enable the linkage of demographic be-
haviour with gender norms and the meanings men and women give to their experiences
need to be used.
Conversely, the history of gender could benefit from the results gained in historical
demography. This discipline provides empirical evidence of the changes of fundamental
elements in the lives of men and women in the past – changing life expectancies; whether
or not they could get married and how selection of a spouse operated; if they became
parents of numerous or reduced families. Historical demography informs us of who
composed the households, who worked at home and who entered the labour market,
who migrated or not. All these changes modified the social positions of men and
women and their respective power relations. Furthermore, many hypotheses elaborated
in gender history by analysis of norms and institutions could be tested systematically
on the individual level, thanks to the databases constituted by research in historical
demography. Why then not use the data, the models and the statistical procedures
produced in historical demography? Why not convince researchers in this field to
integrate systematically some variables pertinent for gender analysis? A great challenge,
but undoubtedly a fruitful enterprise.
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